| Theoria | |
| Burge on Perception and the Disjunction Problem | |
| Jon Altschul1  | |
| [1] Loyola University-New Orleans; | |
| 关键词: perception, anti-Individualism, teleology, disjunction problem, twin earth; | |
| DOI : 10.1387/theoria.11008 | |
| 来源: DOAJ | |
【 摘 要 】
The Disjunction Problem states that teleological theories of perception cannot explain why a subject represents an F when an F causes the perception and not the disjunction F v G, given that the subject has mistaken G’s for F’s in the past. Without a suitable answer, non-veridical representation becomes impossible to explain. Here, I defend Burge’s teleological theory of perception against the Disjunction Problem, arguing that a perceptual state’s representing a disjunctive property is incompatible with perceptual anti-individualism. Because anti-individualism is at the heart of Burge’s theory, I conclude that Burgeans need not be concerned with the Disjunction Problem.
【 授权许可】
Unknown