Evolutionary Games of Low-Carbon Behaviors of Construction Stakeholders under Carbon Taxes

International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health

Youdan Huang¹  Jiao Wu¹  Yunqing Yan¹  Chanchan Hao¹  Qiang Du¹ 

[1] School of Economics and Management, Chang’an University, Xi’an 710064, China;

关键词: low-carbon buildings;    carbon tax;    evolutionary game;    low-carbon behaviors;   

DOI  :  10.3390/ijerph18020508

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

The development of low-carbon buildings (LCBs) in China has not reached its expected status, although the Chinese government has formulated many relevant regulations. The real estate developers and consumers are essential participants in the development of LCBs. This paper explores whether the government’s implementation of the carbon tax will change their choices of LCBs. Evolutionary game models between developers and consumers are established under static and dynamic carbon taxes. Their evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) are deduced in different situations. According to the real scenarios in China, numerical simulations are further conducted to show that carbon tax influences the low-carbon behaviors of stakeholders in the construction industry. Under a static carbon tax, the two players cannot reach an equilibrium state, while the game system is stable under a dynamic tax. The probability of the developers constructing LCBs is positively related to the carbon tax, while its degree is gradually weakened as the tax rate increases. Therefore, an appropriate tax should be set to promote the development of LCBs effectively. Finally, policy implications are put forwarded to guide the participants’ low-carbon behaviors and reduce the carbon emissions in the Chinese construction industry.

【 授权许可】

Unknown