Intercept-Resend Emulation Attacks against a Continuous-Variable Quantum Authentication Protocol with Physical Unclonable Keys

Cryptography

Marc Fischlin¹  Gernot Alber²  Lukas Fladung²  GeorgiosM. Nikolopoulos² 

[1] Cryptoplexity, Technische Universität Darmstadt, D-64289 Darmstadt, Germany;Institut für Angewandte Physik, Technische Universität Darmstadt, D-64289 Darmstadt, Germany;

关键词: physical unclonable keys;    physical unclonable functions;    continuous-variable quantum authentication;    emulation attack;    dual homodyne detection;    unambiguous state-discrimination;    minimum-error discrimination;    square-root measurement;   

DOI  :  10.3390/cryptography3040025

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Optical physical unclonable keys are currently considered to be rather promising candidates for the development of entity authentication protocols, which offer security against both classical and quantum adversaries. In this work, we investigate the robustness of a continuous-variable protocol, which relies on the scattering of coherent states of light from the key, against three different types of intercept−resend emulation attacks. The performance of the protocol is analyzed for a broad range of physical parameters, and our results are compared to existing security bounds.

【 授权许可】

Unknown