The Political Economy of the State Participation Fund: A historical and institutional approach

Cadernos Gestão Pública e Cidadania

Kleber Pacheco de Castro¹  Ana Carolina da Cruz Lima² 

[1] FINANCE – Finanças, Análise e Consultoria Econômica, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil;Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Instituto de Economia, Rio de Janeiro, RJ, Brasil;

关键词: intergovernmental transfer;    tax equalization;    fiscal federalism;    state participation fund;    sharing criterion;   

DOI  :  https://doi.org/10.12660/cgpc.v27n86.81851

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

The State Participation Fund (FPE) has undergone a number of changes to its legislation, which have essentially sought tochangethevolumeofresourcesmakingupthefund(vertical distribution) or to change the distribution rule for these resources (distribution horizontal). In the first case, the political context of greater or lesser centralization of power in the Union is decisive. In the second case, the explanation for the pattern of FPE sharing lies in the disproportionality of the political representation of the different regions in the National Congress and in the regionalist and non-cooperative sentiment that prevails in the federative relations in the country. This scenario helps to understand why attempts to change the system are blocked, even when the change starts from a judicial determination. The result is the construction of a skewed fund, which passes off a tax equalization system, as observable in the most advanced federations.

【 授权许可】

Unknown