Substantial :union: or Substantial Distinction of Mind and Body in Descartes\' Metaphysics

Metaphysik

f Jamei¹  m Akrami¹ 

[1] Islamic Azad University-Science and Research Branch;

关键词: Descartes;    mind;    body;    substantial :union:;    substantial distinction;   

DOI  :  

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

According to Descartes’ metaphysics there are two different kinds of substances in the world of creatures: “thinking substance” and “extended substance” or soul and matter. In Descartes’ philosophy the soul is equal to the mind and considered as a “thinking substance”. This immaterial substance is the essence of the human being. Body, being considered as a “matter“, is an “extended substance” and entirely distinct from the soul. The soul, therefore, exists and may be known prior to body and, not being corporeal, can exist after human death. Hence, Descartes can prove the immortality of human soul in the framework of the principle of substantial distinction. On the other hand, as a physiologist and psychologist, Descartes indeed believes in mind-body :union:, so that some causal interactions between mind and body show their substantial :union:. In this essay, the authors show that Descartes faces a serious problem in combining substantial :union: of mind and body with their substantial distinction despite of his efforts in introducing the idea of pineal gland, the problem remains unsolved. Therefore it seems that as he cannot dispense with his only reason for proving the immortality of human soul, he has to hold the mind-body distinction theory in his metaphysics. Indeed, Descartes prefers to support the distinction theory rather than :union: theory in confronting a thesis and an antithesis stating one of two theories.

【 授权许可】

Unknown