Public-Goods Games with Endogenous Institution-Formation: Experimental Evidence on the Effect of the Voting Rule

Games

Jiawen Li¹  Róbert F. Veszteg²  Yukihiko Funaki² 

[1] Department of Economics, Lancaster University Management School, Bailrigg, Lancaster LA1 4YX, UK;School of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, Nishiwaseda 1-6-1, Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050, Japan;

关键词: institution formation;    laboratory experiment;    plurality voting;    public-goods game;    unanimity voting;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g8040052

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

We report experimental results on voluntary contributions to public-goods provision from situations in which parties can create institutions to impose a certain contribution level on its members. We focus on a public-goods game where the joint decisions inside the institution are made based on the plurality voting rule. We show that, comparing to the unanimity voting rule, the plurality rule results in a significant and large decrease in the institution initiation rate, along with a significant and large increase in the institution implementation rate. In the end, as the two effects cancel each other out, the choice of the voting rule does not significantly affect the average contribution level or efficiency.

【 授权许可】

Unknown