Dislocation and Self-Certainty

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly

Cressida J Heyes¹ 

[1] University of Alberta;

关键词: ethics;    moral theory;    disorientation;    virtue;    feminist philosophy;   

DOI  :  10.5206/fpq/2018.2.3485

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

This article summarizes Ami Harbin’s 2016 monograph, Disorientation and Moral Life, which argues that disorientations are an invaluable ethical resource. Harbin offers what she calls a “non-resolvist account of moral agency,” in which non-deliberative and non-decisive action has the potential to be just as morally significant as fully thought-through and conclusive decision-making. It then suggests that Harbin’s moral method provides a useful way of thinking through political inequities in the discipline of Philosophy, and illustrates this with some examples. It highlights three lacunae or possible extensions to the argument: the value but also the complexity of understanding “doubling back” strategies; the ambivalence between psychological and philosophical claims about the value of irresoluteness and the paradoxical nature of being certain of the value of moral uncertainty; and the spatial, temporal, and embodied nature of disorientation.

【 授权许可】

Unknown