Evolutionary Game Analysis of Three-Player for Low-Carbon Production Capacity Sharing

Sustainability

Jiaqin Hao¹  Daozhi Zhao¹  Hongshuai Han¹  Cejun Cao² 

[1] College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China;School of Business Planning, Chongqing Technology and Business University, Chongqing 400067, China;

关键词: sharing economy;    collaborative production;    low-carbon production capacity sharing;    evolutionary game;    evolutionary stability strategy;   

DOI  :  10.3390/su11112996

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

In the era of the sharing economy, the rise of production capacity sharing has changed traditional manufacturing modes and broken the balance of original production systems. In addition to that environmental-friendly manufacturing enterprises are of great significance with regard to production capacity sharing and sustainable development of the ecology environment. To investigate the decision-making behaviors of the participants involved in low-carbon production capacity sharing, an evolutionary game model taking into account the platforms, manufacturing enterprises with idle production capacity, and those with demanding production capacity is constructed. Then, both evolutionary game theory and Lyapunov stability theorem are used to analyze the asymptotic stability of the equilibrium and evolutionary stability strategies of the system. Besides, the economic and managerial significance of the evolutionary stability strategy is given. Finally, the influence of low-carbon production capacity of enterprises on the stability of the dynamic system is discussed, such as the cost effect of low-carbon production capacity, the effect of transaction cost, and so on. Results indicate that they can provide theoretical reference for decision-making with respect to the platforms, manufacturing enterprises, and sustainable development of the dynamic system.

【 授权许可】

Unknown