Hume's Objection from Evil to the Design Argument and Skeptical Theism

پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین

Seyed Mohammad Hadi Hedayatzadeh Razavi¹  Amir Saemi² 

[1] Assistant Professor at the School of Mathematics, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran;Assistant Professor at the School of philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran;

关键词: design argument;    teleological argument;    hume;    evil;    skeptical theism;   

DOI  :  10.30497/prr.2020.75373

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Abstract. In Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Hume seeks to refute the teleological argument on the basis of the existence of evil in the world. This paper addresses this main objection of Hume’s. I will discuss whether a skeptical theist, in particular, is in a position to answer Hume’s objection. The problem for skeptical theists is that Hume’s objection to the design argument is structurally symmetrical to their solution to the problem of evil. I will argue that this structural symmetry can be specified in two ways, which I will call “unknown reasons for the design” and “ignorance of God’s reasons”. I will argue that while the first symmetry is not threatening to the design argument, the second symmetry poses a serious problem for the design argument. Nevertheless, I will argue that a theist may be able to respond to the problem, provided that she weakens her conclusion sufficiently, and that she takes onboard certain assumptions.

【 授权许可】

Unknown