Centralized and Decentralized Recycle Policy with Transboundary Pollution

Environments

Yu-Lin Wang¹  Jen-Yao Lee²  Chien-Hui Lee²  Po-Sheng Ko³  Jiong-Hung Kwo⁴ 

[1] Department of Economics, National Chung Cheng University, Chiayi 621301, Taiwan;Department of International Business, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung 80778, Taiwan;Department of Public Finance and Taxation, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung 80778, Taiwan;School of Management and Economics, Kunming University of Science and Technology, Kunming 650559, China;

关键词: transboundary pollution;    recycle policy;    recycling fee;    treatment subsidy;   

DOI  :  10.3390/environments7050040

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

In this study, under the existence of unilateral cross-border environmental pollution in two regions, a complete information dynamic game theory is constructed to discuss the environmental policy (recycling fee and treatment subsidy) formulation of the central government by two local governments. As a result, it was found that the spillover effect will reduce the level of social welfare. At the same time, the intervention of the central government and the adoption of policies tailored to local conditions will be conducive to the improvement of social welfare.

【 授权许可】

Unknown