Cooperative Game for Fish Harvesting and Pollution Control

Games

Ben Mansour Dia¹  Mouhamadou Samsidy Goudiaby²  Mamadou L. Diagne³  Hamidou Tembine⁴ 

[1] College of Petroleum Engineering and Geosciences (CPG), King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals (KFUPM), Dhahran 31261, Saudi Arabia;Département de Mathématiques, UFR des Sciences et Technologies, Université Assane Seck de Ziguinchor, Ziguinchor BP 523, Senegal;Département de Mathématiques, UFR des Sciences et Technologies, Université de Thiés, Thiés BP 967, Senegal;Learning & Game Theory Laboratory (L&G-Lab), Division of Engineering, Saadiyat Campus, New York University Abu Dhabi (NYUAD), Abu Dhabi P.O. Box 129188, United Arab Emirates;

关键词: biodiversity preservation;    stability analysis;    optimal control;    cooperative game;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g12030065

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

This paper studies fishery strategies in lakes, seas, and shallow rivers subject to agricultural and industrial pollution. The flowing pollutants are modeled by a nonlinear differential equation in a general manner. The logistic growth model for the fish population is modified to cover the pollution impact on the fish growth rate. We start by presenting the stability analysis of the dynamical system to discern the different types of the evolution of the fish population according to human actions. A cooperative game is formulated to design strategies for preserving the fish population by controlling the pollution as well as the fish stock for harvesting. The sufficient conditions for implementing the cooperative strategy are investigated through an incentive design approach with an adaptive taxation policy for the players. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the benefit of the cooperative for fish population preservation but also for the players’ rewards.

【 授权许可】

Unknown