| IEEE Access | |
| Fully-Digital Randomization Based Side-Channel Security—Toward Ultra-Low Cost-per-Security | |
| Itamar Levi1  Rinat Breuer2  Francois-Xavier Standaert3  | |
| [1] Catholique de Louvain, Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;Faculty of Engineering, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel;ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group, Universit&x00E9; | |
| 关键词: Countermeasures; hiding; localization; low-cost; masking; power-gating; | |
| DOI : 10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3185995 | |
| 来源: DOAJ | |
【 摘 要 】
In this paper we formulate and re-evaluate a recently proposed randomization-based side-channel protection mechanism. The strength of the construction lies with its ability to comply with standard digital design flows and that it provides a security parameter which directly links side-channel security metrics. A detailed leakage model is provided and investigated for the first time, and it is linked to electronic parameters of the randomization mechanism. We develop guidelines and optimization for concrete ASIC constructions, and sheds light on this ultra low-cost leakage-randomization mechanism. The proposed circuit is natural to be utilized without or on top of the popular masking countermeasures. It is demonstrated to be considerably more efficient in terms of attack data-complexity as compared to low-order masking (i.e., number of shares
【 授权许可】
Unknown