Journal of Cybersecurity and Privacy | |
Unsupervised Machine Learning Techniques for Detecting PLC Process Control Anomalies | |
J. W. Bruce1  Emmanuel Aboah Boateng1  | |
[1] Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, TN 38505, USA; | |
关键词: cyber-physical systems; anomaly detection; programmable logic controllers (PLCs); one-class support vector machine (OCSVM); one-class neural network (OCNN); isolation forest (IF); | |
DOI : 10.3390/jcp2020012 | |
来源: DOAJ |
【 摘 要 】
The security of programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that control industrial systems is becoming increasingly critical due to the ubiquity of the Internet of Things technologies and increasingly nefarious cyber-attack activity. Conventional techniques for safeguarding PLCs are difficult due to their unique architectures. This work proposes a one-class support vector machine, one-class neural network interconnected in a feed-forward manner, and isolation forest approaches for verifying PLC process integrity by monitoring PLC memory addresses. A comprehensive experiment is conducted using an open-source PLC subjected to multiple attack scenarios. A new histogram-based approach is introduced to visualize anomaly detection algorithm performance and prediction confidence. Comparative performance analyses of the proposed algorithms using decision scores and prediction confidence are presented. Results show that isolation forest outperforms one-class neural network, one-class support vector machine, and previous work, in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, and F1-score on seven attack scenarios considered. Statistical hypotheses tests involving analysis of variance and Tukey’s range test were used to validate the presented results.
【 授权许可】
Unknown