Absential Suspension: Malebranche and Locke on Human Freedom

Journal of Modern Philosophy

Thomas M. Lennon¹  Julie Walsh² 

[1] The University of Western Ontario;Wellesley College;

关键词: Malebranche;    Locke;    Freedom;    Suspension;    Power;   

DOI  :  10.32881/jomp.31

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

This paper treats a heretofore-unnoticed concept in the history of the philosophical discussion of human freedom, a kind of freedom that is not defined solely in terms of the causal power of the agent. Instead, the exercise of freedom essentially involves the 'non-occurrence' of something. That being free involves the 'non-occurrence', that is, the 'absence', of an act may seem counterintuitive. With the exception of those specifically treated in this paper, philosophers tend to think of freedom as intimately involved with volition, the judging or deciding activity of the will that votes in favor of or against a proposed action. However, there are two thinkers who endorse a view where not willing constitutes human freedom. Our analysis focuses on the views of Malebranche and Locke. Both invoke a notion dubbed here as ‘absential suspension.’ On this view, freedom is associated not with the power of volition, but rather with this kind of suspension.

【 授权许可】

Unknown