Entropy | |
Not All Structure and Dynamics Are Equal | |
Garrett Mindt1  | |
[1] Elizabeth R Koch Research Fellow, Tiny Blue Dot Foundation for Consciousness Studies, Department of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin–Madison, Madison, WI 53719, USA; | |
关键词: consciousness; physicalism; structure and dynamics; hard problem; complexity; Integrated Information Theory; | |
DOI : 10.3390/e23091226 | |
来源: DOAJ |
【 摘 要 】
The hard problem of consciousness has been a perennially vexing issue for the study of consciousness, particularly in giving a scientific and naturalized account of phenomenal experience. At the heart of the hard problem is an often-overlooked argument, which is at the core of the hard problem, and that is the structure and dynamics (S&D) argument. In this essay, I will argue that we have good reason to suspect that the S&D argument given by David Chalmers rests on a limited conception of S&D properties, what in this essay I’m calling extrinsic structure and dynamics. I argue that if we take recent insights from the complexity sciences and from recent developments in Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness, that we get a more nuanced picture of S&D, specifically, a class of properties I’m calling intrinsic structure and dynamics. This I think opens the door to a broader class of properties with which we might naturally and scientifically explain phenomenal experience, as well as the relationship between syntactic, semantic, and intrinsic notions of information. I argue that Chalmers’ characterization of structure and dynamics in his S&D argument paints them with too broad a brush and fails to account for important nuances, especially when considering accounting for a system’s intrinsic properties. Ultimately, my hope is to vindicate a certain species of explanation from the S&D argument, and by extension dissolve the hard problem of consciousness at its core, by showing that not all structure and dynamics are equal.
【 授权许可】
Unknown