Divine command theory: logical refutation and theological justification

Вестник Православного Свято-Тихоновского гуманитарного университета: Серия I. Богословие, философия

Elena Stepanova¹ 

[1] Ural Institute of HumanitiesUral Federal University, Lenina Av. 51, Ekaterinburg, 620000, Russia;

关键词: morality;    revelation;    obedience;    divine command;    euthyphro dilemma;    moral autonomy;    pluralism;    мораль;    откровение;    послушание;    божественное повеление;    дилемма евтифрона;    моральная автономия;    плюрализм;   

DOI  :  http://dx.doi.org/10.15382/sturI202087.70-86

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

In the article, the problem of sources of moral authority in intellectual history associated with Christianity is observed. Among possible concepts of moral sources, namely, virtue ethics, ethics of natural law, and divine command theory, the focus is on the latter. The author describes main principles of divine command theory (DCT): it is based on the conviction that the essence of morality, i. e. the concept of good and evil, justice and injustice, etc., directly depends on God’s commands and prohibitions. In the last decades of the twentieth century, the principle of divine command as an independent theory has obtained a fresh impetus in English-speaking analytic philosophy. The meta-ethical nature of the divine command theory reveals inself in defining ethical judgments through theological concepts. The main provisions of the divine command theory are defi ned: fi rstly, the identity of a prescribing or prohibiting divine will as a source of morality, and will in the form of obedience as the cause of moral action; secondly, a consideration of moral prescriptions as the subject of revelation (faith), but not of rational choice; thirdly, the sovereignty of God as a source of morality. The main critical arguments addressed to the divine command theory are considered: fi rstly, arguments, which arose from so-called “Euthyphro dilemma” related to the arbitrary nature of the concept of good, as well as to the question of what is primary — the concept of good or divine command; secondly, the incompatibility of the divine command theory with moral autonomy; thirdly, critique of the divine command theory from the standpoint of pluralism, and the problem of the DCT’s persuasiveness for unbelievers, or adherents of other religions besides Christianity. The author concludes that the divine command theory seems to be unconvinced from a rational point of view; at the same time, rational critical arguments seem to be useless for theologically-minded researchers. Nonetheless, such discrepancy does not exclude the need to find adequate forms of dialogue between believers and non-believers.

【 授权许可】

Unknown