TEDT, a Leakage-Resist AEAD Mode for High Physical Security Applications

Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems

Olivier Pereira¹  François-Xavier Standaert²  Chun Guo²  Francesco Berti²  Thomas Peters² 

[1] School of Cyber Science and Technology and Key Laboratory of Cryptologic Technology and Information Security, Ministry of Education, Shandong University;ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group, UCL, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium;

关键词: Authenticated encryption;    leakage-resilience/resistance;    beyond-birthday bound;    multi-user security;    masking countermeasures;    leveled implementations;   

DOI  :  10.13154/tches.v2020.i1.256-320

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

We propose TEDT, a new Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) mode leveraging Tweakable Block Ciphers (TBCs). TEDT provides the following features: (i) It offers full leakage-resistance, that is, it limits the exploitability of physical leakages via side-channel attacks, even if these leakages happen during every message encryption and decryption operation. Moreover, the leakage integrity bound is asymptotically optimal in the multi-user setting. (ii) It offers nonce misuse-resilience, that is, the repetition of nonces does not impact the security of ciphertexts produced with fresh nonces. (iii) It can be implemented with a remarkably low energy cost when strong resistance to side-channel attacks is needed, supports online encryption and handles static and incremental associated data efficiently. Concretely, TEDT encourages so-called leveled implementations, in which two TBCs are implemented: the first one needs strong and energy demanding protections against side-channel attacks but is used in a limited way, while the other only requires weak and energy-efficient protections and performs the bulk of the computation. As a result, TEDT leads to more energy-efficient implementations compared to traditional AEAD schemes, whose side-channel security requires to uniformly protect every (T)BC execution.

【 授权许可】

Unknown