Instability of Mixed Nash Equilibria in Generalised Hawk-Dove Game: A Project Conflict Management Scenario

Games

Mikhail Prokopenko¹  Sheryl Le Chang¹ 

[1] Complex Systems Research Group, Faculty of Engineering and IT, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia;

关键词: evolutionary game theory;    project conflict management;    Nash equilibrium;    Hawk-Dove game;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g8040042

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

This paper generalises the Hawk-Dove evolutionary game by introducing cost sharing ratios for both players, and applies the generalised Hawk-Dove model to conflict management in projects through investigating the stability of Nash equilibria. A model with clashing interests between a project owner and a contractor is considered to derive their strategy adaptation given the cost sharing ratios. As expected, the pure Nash equilibria are shown to be dominantly stable while the mixed strategy equilibrium is observed to be unstable, across the range of considered cost sharing ratios. In addition, simulations are conducted on the strategy adaptation and stability of the equilibria under noisy and latent conditions. The obtained results can be used by project managers in optimising their strategy in practice.

【 授权许可】

Unknown