Irrigation experiments in the lab: trust, environmental variability, and collective action

Ecology and Society

Jacopo A. Baggio¹  Irene Pérez¹  Nathan D. Rollins²  Marco A. Janssen³ 

[1] Center for Behavior, Institutions and the Environment, Arizona State University;Center for Behavior, Institutions and the Environment, School of Human Evolution and Social Change, Arizona State University;Center for Behavior, Institutions and the Environment, School of Sustainability, Arizona State University;

关键词: asymmetry;    common-pool resources;    feedbacks;    laboratory experiments;    trust;    variability;   

DOI  :  10.5751/ES-07772-200412

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Research on collective action and common-pool resources is extensive. However, little work has concentrated on the effect of variability in resource availability and collective action, especially in the context of asymmetric access to resources. Earlier works have demonstrated that environmental variability often leads to a reduction of collective action in the governance of shared resources. Here we assess how environmental variability may impact collective action. We performed a behavioral experiment involving an irrigation dilemma. In this dilemma participants invested first into a public fund that generated water resources for the group, which were subsequently appropriated by one participant at a time from head end to tail end. The amount of resource generated for the given investment level was determined by a payoff table and a stochastic event representing environmental variability, i.e., rainfall. Results show that that (1) upstream users' behavior is by far the most important variable in determining the outcome of collective action; (2) environmental variability (i.e. risk level in investing in the resource) has little effect on individual investment and extraction levels; and (3) the action-reaction feedback is fundamental in determining the success or failure of communities.

【 授权许可】

Unknown