Spoofing Detection Using GNSS/INS/Odometer Coupling for Vehicular Navigation

Sensors

卷:18

Ali Broumandan¹  Gérard Lachapelle¹ 

[1] Position, Location and Navigation (PLAN) Group, Schulich School of Engineering, University of Calgary, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada;

关键词: global navigation satellite systems (GNSS);    spoofing;    detection;    IMU;    vehicular navigation;   

DOI  :  10.3390/s18051305

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Location information is one of the most vital information required to achieve intelligent and context-aware capability for various applications such as driverless cars. However, related security and privacy threats are a major holdback. With increasing focus on using Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) for autonomous navigation and related applications, it is important to provide robust navigation solutions, yet signal spoofing for illegal or covert transportation and misleading receiver timing is increasing and now frequent. Hence, detection and mitigation of spoofing attacks has become an important topic. Several contributions on spoofing detection have been made, focusing on different layers of a GNSS receiver. This paper focuses on spoofing detection utilizing self-contained sensors, namely inertial measurement units (IMUs) and vehicle odometer outputs. A spoofing detection approach based on a consistency check between GNSS and IMU/odometer mechanization is proposed. To detect a spoofing attack, the method analyses GNSS and IMU/odometer measurements independently during a pre-selected observation window and cross checks the solutions provided by GNSS and inertial navigation solution (INS)/odometer mechanization. The performance of the proposed method is verified in real vehicular environments. Mean spoofing detection time and detection performance in terms of receiver operation characteristics (ROC) in sub-urban and dense urban environments are evaluated.

【 授权许可】

Unknown