Composable Masking Schemes in the Presence of Physical Defaults & the Robust Probing Model

Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems

卷:2018

Clara Paglialonga¹  Vincent Grosso²  François-Xavier Standaert³  Sebastian Faust³  Santos Merino Del Pozo⁴ 

[1] DarkMatter LLC, Abu Dhabi;

[2] Radboud University Nijmegen, Digital Security Group;

[3] Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt;

[4] Université catholique de Louvain, ICTEAM/ELEN/Crypto Group, Belgium;

关键词: Side-channel analysis;    security proofs;    physical defaults;    composability;   

DOI  :  10.13154/tches.v2018.i3.89-120

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Composability and robustness against physical defaults (e.g., glitches) are two highly desirable properties for secure implementations of masking schemes. While tools exist to guarantee them separately, no current formalism enables their joint investigation. In this paper, we solve this issue by introducing a new model, the robust probing model, that is naturally suited to capture the combination of these properties. We first motivate this formalism by analyzing the excellent robustness and low randomness requirements of first-order threshold implementations, and highlighting the difficulty to extend them to higher orders. Next, and most importantly, we use our theory to design and prove the first higher-order secure, robust and composable multiplication gadgets. While admittedly inspired by existing approaches to masking (e.g., Ishai-Sahai-Wagner-like, threshold, domain-oriented), these gadgets exhibit subtle implementation differences with these state-of-the-art solutions (none of which being provably composable and robust). Hence, our results illustrate how sound theoretical models can guide practically-relevant implementations.

【 授权许可】

Unknown