“Knower” as an Ethical Concept: From Epistemic Agency to Mutual Recognition

Feminist Philosophy Quarterly

卷:4

Matthew Congdon¹ 

[1] Vanderbilt University;

关键词: ethics;    social epistemology;    feminist epistemology;    recognition;    epistemic injustice;   

DOI  :  10.5206/fpq/2018.4.6228

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

Recent discussions in critical social epistemology have raised the idea that the concept “knower” is not only an epistemological concept but an ethical concept as well. Though this idea plays a central role in these discussions, the theoretical underpinnings of the claim have not received extended scrutiny. This paper explores the idea that “knower” is an irreducibly ethical concept in an effort to defend its use as a critical concept. In section 1, I begin with the claim that “knower” is an irreducibly normative and social concept, drawing from some ideas in Wilfrid Sellars. In section 2, I argue that one’s being a knower involves demands for various sorts of ethically laden recognition. I develop this thought by arguing that Axel Honneth’s threefold typology of recognition—love, respect, and esteem—finds clear expression within the context of socio-epistemic practice. I conclude in section 3 by arguing that Miranda Fricker’s proposed “analogy” between epistemic and moral perception should be modified to indicate a closer relationship than mere analogy.

【 授权许可】

Unknown