“Life is knowledge”: S. Frank and West European transcendental tradition of understanding the phenomenon of life

Антиномии

卷:20

关键词: transcendental philosophy;    phenomenology;    subjectivity;    constitution;    transcendence;    lifeworld;    lived body;    passive synthesis;    all-unity;    alive knowledge;    living being;    inanimate object;    the conscious;    the before-conscious;   

DOI  :  10.24411/2686-7206-2020-10102

来源: DOAJ

【 摘 要 】

The article is a transcendental phenomenological research for the phenomenonof life that shows how from the point of view of theory of knowledge it is possible toexplain the consciousness of the difference between animate and inanimate objects,as well as changes in the understanding of this difference in the development of WestEuropean thought.The analysis of Kant's conception of a “natural purpose” and Husserl's conception of the“lived body” shows that the living being differs from the inanimate object by the specialcharacter of causality. However, Kant's apriorism can’t explain the existence of various typesof objects, such as the animate and the inanimate, in conscious experience that subjects togeneral a priory forms. Kant is forced to admit that it is impossible to cognize a priori the specialcausality of the living beings – causality, which is not reduced to the “efficient cause” thatdetermines the objective order of phenomena. Husserl fails to show that the phenomenonof life is rooted in subjectivity, i.e. he fails to understand the phenomenon within theframework of the phenomenological project of understanding consciousness as the singlefield of sense-giving. Moreover, the late reflections of the philosopher demonstrate theimpossibility of constituting the animate object within passivity – the deepest layer of senseaccomplishments that precedes ego’s synthetic activity.S. L. Frank’s studies show that the basis of the spiritual unity is the unity that goesbeyond the sphere of consciousness. It allows Frank to prove that there is an inseparableconnection between life and knowledge, but his understanding of life as absolute beingcannot be considered as proved.Clarifying the relationship between the concepts of “life” and “knowledge”, the authorshows how the change of cognitive attitudes brings a new understanding of the place androle of life in the human-conscious world. First, there is a change from the identificationof truth and life, from the recognition of the world as an alive world to the assertion of theexistence of not only animate but also inanimate things, then, there is a reduction of life tothe organism – the subject of biology, and finally – the gradual disappearance of life fromconsciousness, erasing the semantic boundary between a living being and a machine.