On Lies and Hard Truths

Frontiers in Psychology

article

Sascha Behnk¹  Ernesto Reuben³ 

[1] Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich;IU International University of Applied Sciences;Social Science Division, New York University Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates;Center for Behavioral Institutional Design, New York University Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates

关键词: lying;    hard truth;    sender-receiver games;    social image;    antisocial behavior;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2021.687913

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

We run an experimental study using sender-receiver games to evaluate how senders' willingness to lie to others compares to their willingness to tell hard truths, i.e., promote an outcome that the sender knows is unfair to the receiver without explicitly lying. Unlike in previous work on lying when it has consequences, we do not find that antisocial behavior is less frequent when it involves lying than when it does not. In fact, we find the opposite result in the setting where there is social contact between senders and receivers, and receivers have enough information to judge whether they have been treated unfairly. In this setting, we find that senders prefer to hide behind a lie and implement the antisocial outcome by being dishonest rather than by telling the truth. These results are consistent with social image costs depending on the social proximity between senders and receivers, especially when receivers can judge the kindness of the senders' actions.

【 授权许可】

CC BY