Distrust, False Cues, and Below-Chance Deception Detection Accuracy: Commentary on Stel et al. (2020) and Further Reflections on (Un)Conscious Lie Detection From the Perspective of Truth-Default Theory

Frontiers in Psychology

article

Timothy R. Levine¹ 

[1] Department of Communication Studies, University of Alabama at Birmingham, United States

关键词: deception;    unconscious;    deception detection;    truth-default theory;    lying;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2021.642359

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

This essay has two distinct aims: commentary on Stel et al. (2020) and addressing (Un)ConsciousLie Detection from the Perspective of Truth-Default Theory. Stel et al. (2020) advance the counterintuitive claim that distrust inhibits truth detection by prompting more deliberate reliance onfalse beliefs about deception cues. Their proposed mechanism lacks plausibility because cues aregenerally non- rather than anti-diagnostic. Truth-default theory offers different predictions thatmay explain the inconsistent findings observed across the previous literature. When in the truthdefault state, accuracy is a function of message veracity. People correctly believe honest messagesand are duped by lies. In prompted demeanor-based lie detection tasks, accuracy is a function ofsender demeanor-veracity matching and sender sampling. In lie detection tasks where messagecontent is diagnostic, deliberative processing improves accuracy.

【 授权许可】

CC BY