Malware Guard Extension: abusing Intel SGX to conceal cache attacks

Cybersecurity

article

Schwarz, Michael¹  Weiser, Samuel¹  Gruss, Daniel¹  Maurice, Clémentine²  Mangard, Stefan¹ 

[1] Graz University of Technology;CNRS, IRISA

关键词: Intel SGX;    Side channel;    Side-channel attack;    Prime+Probe;   

DOI  :  10.1186/s42400-019-0042-y

学科分类：社会科学、人文和艺术（综合）

来源: Springer

【 摘 要 】

In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on the same physical machine. However, the hypervisor does not protect tenants against the cloud provider and thus, the supplied operating system and hardware. Intel SGX provides a mechanism that addresses this scenario. It aims at protecting user-level software from attacks from other processes, the operating system, and even physical attackers.In this paper, we demonstrate fine-grained software-based side-channel attacks from a malicious SGX enclave targeting co-located enclaves. Our attack is the first malware running on real SGX hardware, abusing SGX protection features to conceal itself. Furthermore, we demonstrate our attack both in a native environment and across multiple Docker containers. We perform a Prime+Probe cache side-channel attack on a co-located SGX enclave running an up-to-date RSA implementation that uses a constant-time multiplication primitive. The attack works, although in SGX enclaves, there are no timers, no large pages, no physical addresses, and no shared memory. In a semi-synchronous attack, we extract 96 % of an RSA private key from a single trace. We extract the full RSA private key in an automated attack from 11 traces within 5 min.

【 授权许可】

CC BY