Tripartite Evolutionary Game Model for Public Health Emergencies

Discrete dynamics in nature and society

article

Zhiqi Xu¹  Yukun Cheng¹  Shuangliang Yao² 

[1] School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology;Jiangsu University of Science and Technology

DOI  :  10.1155/2021/6693597

学科分类：安全、风险、质量和可靠性

来源: Hindawi Publishing Corporation

【 摘 要 】

Public health emergencies are more related to the safety and health of the public. For the management of the public health emergencies, all parties’ cooperation is the key to preventing and controlling the emergencies. Based on the assumption of bounded rationality, we formulate a tripartite evolutionary game model, involving the local government, the enterprises, and the public, for the public health emergency, e.g., COVID-19. The evolutionary stable strategies under different conditions of the tripartite evolutionary game are explored, and the effect from different factors on the decision-makings of participants for public health emergencies is also analyzed. Numerical analysis results show that formulating reasonable subsidy measures, encouraging the participation of the public, and enforcing the punishment to enterprises for their negative behaviors can prompt three parties to cooperate in fighting against the epidemic. Our work enriches an understanding of the governance for the public health emergency and provides theoretical support for the local government and related participants to make proper decisions in public health emergencies.

【 授权许可】

CC BY