Representation Wars: Enacting an Armistice Through Active Inference

Frontiers in Psychology

Axel Constant¹  Andy Clark²  Karl J. Friston³ 

[1] Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia;Department of Philosophy, The University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom;Department of Informatics, The University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom;Department of Philosophy, Macquarie University, Sydney, NSW, Australia;Wellcome Trust Centre for Human Neuroimaging, University College London, London, United Kingdom;

关键词: philosophy of cognitive science;    free energy principle;    active inference;    embodiment;    representationalism;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fpsyg.2020.598733

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

Over the last 30 years, representationalist and dynamicist positions in the philosophy of cognitive science have argued over whether neurocognitive processes should be viewed as representational or not. Major scientific and technological developments over the years have furnished both parties with ever more sophisticated conceptual weaponry. In recent years, an enactive generalization of predictive processing – known as active inference – has been proposed as a unifying theory of brain functions. Since then, active inference has fueled both representationalist and dynamicist campaigns. However, we believe that when diving into the formal details of active inference, one should be able to find a solution to the war; if not a peace treaty, surely an armistice of a sort. Based on an analysis of these formal details, this paper shows how both representationalist and dynamicist sensibilities can peacefully coexist within the new territory of active inference.

【 授权许可】

CC BY