Journal of Social Ontology | |
Modest Sociality: Continuities and Discontinuities | |
article | |
Elisabeth Pacherie1  | |
[1] Institut Jean Nicod ENS, Institut d’Etudes Cognitives | |
关键词: Michael Bratman; Shared agency; Joint action; Shared representations; Discontinuities; | |
DOI : 10.1515/jso-2014-0044 | |
来源: De Gruyter | |
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【 摘 要 】
A central claim in Michael Bratman’s account of shared agency is that there need be no radical conceptual, metaphysical or normative discontinuity between robust forms of small-scale shared intentional agency, i.e., modest sociality, and individual planning agency. What I propose to do is consider another potential discontinuity, whose existence would throw doubt on his contention that the structure of a robust form of modest sociality is entirely continuous with structures at work in individual planning agency. My main point will be that he may be wrong in assuming that the basic cognitive infrastructure sufficient to support individual agency doesn’t have to be supplemented in significant ways to support shared agency.
【 授权许可】
CC BY-NC-ND
【 预 览 】
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