A Two-Step Theory of the Evolution of Human Thinking

Journal of Social Ontology

article

Glenda Satne¹ 

[1] Department of Philosophy, Alberto Hurtado University;School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Law, University of Wollongong - NSW 2522

关键词: Collective intentionality;    Joint intentionality;    Objective content;    Tomasello;    Natural history;   

DOI  :  10.1515/jso-2015-0053

来源: De Gruyter

【 摘 要 】

Social accounts of objective content, like the one advanced by Tomasello (2014), are traditionally challenged by an ‘essential tension’ (Hutto and Satne 2015). The tension is the following: while sociality is deemed to be at the basis of thinking, in order to explain sociality, some form of thinking seems to be necessarily presupposed. In this contribution I analyse Tomasello’s two-step theory of the evolution of human thinking vis-à-vis this challenge. While his theory is in principle suited to address it, I claim that the specifics of the first step and the notion of perspective that infuse it are problematic in this regard. I end by briefly sketching an alternative.

【 授权许可】

CC BY-NC-ND