Sexual Orientation and Choice

Journal of Social Ontology

article

Saray Ayala¹ 

[1] Department of Philosophy, California State University Sacramento

关键词: Sexual orientation;    Choice;    Interpretation;    Sex/Gender;    Conceptualization;    Categorization;   

DOI  :  10.1515/jso-2016-0015

来源: De Gruyter

【 摘 要 】

Is there a choice in sexual orientation? [Wilkerson, William S. (2009): “Is It a Choice? Sexual Orientation as Interpretation”. In: Journal of Social Philosophy 40. No. 1, p. 97–116] argues that sexual desires require interpretation in order to be fully constituted, and therefore sexual orientation is at least partially constituted by choice. [Díaz-León, Esa (2017): “Sexual Orientation as Interpretation? Sexual Desires, Concepts, and Choice”; In: Journal of Social Ontology ] critically assesses Wilkerson’s argument, concluding that we still lack a good argument for the claim that choice plays a role in sexual orientation. Here I examine Díaz-León’s response to Wilkerson. I introduce what I call the conceptual act theory of sexual orientation, and argue that even if interpretation were not necessary to constitute sexual desires, it is a necessary element to constitute what we call sexual orientation. However, I conclude that even if we agree that interpretation is involved in sexual orientation, it does not follow that there is a choice involved.

【 授权许可】

CC BY-NC-ND