The Curious Case of Ronald McDonald’s Claim to Rights: An Ontological Account of Differences in Group and Individual Person Rights

Journal of Social Ontology

article

Leonie Smith¹ 

[1] University of Manchester, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

关键词: Group personhood;    Group rights;    List;    Pettit;    Social ontology;    Arbitrary power;   

DOI  :  10.1515/jso-2016-0042

来源: De Gruyter

【 摘 要 】

Performative accounts of personhood argue that group agents are persons, fit to be held responsible within the social sphere. Nonetheless, these accounts want to retain a moral distinction between group and individual persons. That: (1) Group-persons can be responsible for their actions qua persons, but that (2) group-persons might nonetheless not have rights equivalent to those of human persons. I present an argument which makes sense of this disanalogy, without recourse to normative claims or additional ontological commitments. I instead ground rights in the different relations in which performative persons stand in relation to one another.

【 授权许可】

CC BY-NC-ND