From Simple to Composite Agency: On Kirk Ludwig’s From Individual to Plural Agency

Journal of Social Ontology

article

Olle Blomberg¹ 

[1] Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg;Department of Philosophy, Lund University

关键词: Primitive action;    Composite action;    Collective action;    Action sentences;    I-intention;    Kirk Ludwig;    Ontology of action;   

DOI  :  10.1515/jso-2019-0023

来源: De Gruyter

【 摘 要 】

According to Kirk Ludwig, only primitive actions are actions in a primary and non-derivative sense of the term ‘action’. Ludwig takes this to imply that the notion of collective action is a façon de parler – useful perhaps, but secondary and derivative. I argue that, on the contrary, collective actions are actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. First, this is because some primitive actions are collective actions. Secondly, individual and collective composites of primitive actions are also actions in the primary and non-derivative sense. Hence, individual action and collective action are ontologically on a par. Ludwig also exaggerates the contrast between individual and collective action by introducing a “sole agency requirement” in his account of the semantics of singular action sentences. However, sole agency is merely typically pragmatically implicated by singular action sentences, not entailed by them. If I say, “I turned on the light”, after we each flipped one of two switches that together turned on the light, then I might be misleading the audience, but what I say is true. Finally, I argue that, contra Ludwig, individuals often have “I-intentions” to bring about an event that can be satisfied even if there are co-agents who bring about the event in the same way.

【 授权许可】

CC BY-NC-ND