Optimal Electricity Allocation Model Under China's Planning-Market Double-Track Mechanism Considering Bidding Game of Generation Companies

Frontiers in Energy Research

Li Yang¹  Jiajun Tang¹  Yating Li¹  Zhi Zhang¹  Zhenzhi Lin²  Hualin Cai³  Yongbo Li⁴  Haichao Wang⁴  Chuan He⁴  Jinrui Cui⁴ 

[1] Department of Electrical Engineering, College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China;Department of Electrical Engineering, College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China;Department of Electrical Engineering, College of Electrical Engineering, Shandong University, Jinan, China;State Grid Anhui Electric Power Co., Ltd., Hefei, China;State Grid Anhui Electric Power Co., Ltd., Hefei, China;Anhui Power Exchange Center Company, Hefei, China;

关键词: planning-market double-track mechanism;    electricity allocation;    market power;    residual demand curve;    bidding game;   

DOI  :  10.3389/fenrg.2021.673228

来源: Frontiers

【 摘 要 】

In China, under the planning-market double-track mechanism implemented on the generation side of electricity, unreasonable market-oriented power generation proportion may lead to unnecessary vicious competition and market price changes, and it is against the will of power exchange (PX). Given this background, in this study, a bi-level model for planning-market electricity allocation that considers the bidding game of generation companies is proposed for a smooth transition of power system reform. In the upper level of the model, the proportion of planned electricity is optimized by PX to minimize the average social electricity purchase price. In the lower level of the model, considering the impact of market power on the bidding strategy of generation companies, the bidding strategy of generation companies set as price makers is proposed using the residual demand curve analysis method, while the price takers adopt the lowest bidding strategy. Simulations based on data from a provincial electricity market in China illustrate that the proposed model can effectively reflect the impact of market-oriented electricity proportion on market power and market-clearing price, thus providing a quantitative basis for PX to determine the proportion of market-oriented electricity in total electricity consumption.

【 授权许可】

CC BY