We sold a million units: the role of advertising past-sales

Revista Brasileira de Economia

Paulo K. Monteiro²  José Luis Moraga-gonzález¹ 

[1] ,FGV EPGE

关键词: two-sided uncertainty;    past-sales advertising;    pooling;    signalling;    herding;   

DOI  :  10.1590/S0034-71402003000200004

来源: SciELO

【 摘 要 】

In a market where past-sales embody information about consumers' tastes, we analyze a seller's incentives to invest in a costly advertising campaign to report past-sales. If consumers are poorly informed, a pooling equilibrium with past-sales advertising obtains. Information revelation only occurs when the seller benefits from the consumers' herding behavior brought about by the advertising campaign. If consumers are better informed, a separating equilibrium with past-sales advertising arises. Information revelation always happens, either through prices or through costly advertisements.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
 All the contents of this journal, except where otherwise noted, is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License