DEFENSE-ATTACK INTERACTION OVER OPTIMALLY DESIGNED DEFENSE SYSTEMS VIA GAMES AND RELIABILITY

Pesquisa Operacional

Isis Didier Lins¹  Paulo Renato Alves Firmino¹  Diogo De Carvalho Bezerra¹  Márcio Das Chagas Moura¹  Enrique López Droguett¹  Leandro Chaves Rêgo¹  Carlos Renato Dos Santos¹ 

关键词: Defense systems configuration;    system reliability;    sequential games of complete and perfect information;   

DOI  :  10.1590/0101-7438.2014.034.02.0215

来源: SciELO

【 摘 要 】

This paper analyzes defense systems taking into account the strategic interactions between two rational agents; one of them is interested in designing a defense system against purposeful attacks of the other. The interaction is characterized by a sequential game with perfect and complete information. Reliability plays a fundamental role in both defining agents' actions and in measuring performance of the defense system for which a series-parallel configuration is set up by the defender. The attacker, in turn, focuses on only one defense subsystem in order to maximize her efficiency in attacking. An algorithm involving backward induction is developed to determine the equilibrium paths of the game. Application examples are also provided.

【 授权许可】

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