Estrutura de propriedade e de controle das empresas de capital aberto no Brasil

Revista de Economia Política

Dante Mendes Aldrighi²  Roberto Mazzer Neto¹ 

[1] ,USP FEA Departamento de Economia

关键词: cash-flow rights;    control rights;    controlling shareholder;    pyramidal arrangements;    minority shareholders;    no-voting-rights preferred shares;    ownership structure;    voting agreements;   

DOI  :  10.1590/S0101-31572005000200009

来源: SciELO

【 摘 要 】

This paper has as its main objective to measure the magnitude of deviations between control rights and cash-flow rights for the ultimate shareholder with the largest voting rights of limited liability companies in Brazil. Furthermore, it pinpoints how these discrepancies are generated, evaluating the relative importance of the issuance of preferred stocks with no voting rights, pyramidal arrangements of ownership, and cross-shareholdings. The data set embraces 602 companies that in 2001 complied with the mandatory requirement of filing to the CVM.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
 All the contents of this journal, except where otherwise noted, is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License