Information exchanges in cournot duopolies

Revista Brasileira de Economia

J. Andrés Faíña Medín²  Jesús López Rodríguez¹  José López Rodríguez¹ 

[1] ,European Industrial Economics

关键词: information exchange;    cournot equilibrium;    accuracy effect;    slope uncertainty;    intercept demand uncertainty;   

DOI  :  10.1590/S0034-71402003000100007

来源: SciELO

【 摘 要 】

In this paper we analyze the profitability of information sharing among Cournot oligopolists receiving private information about random demand. We model the random demand as a linear demand having, 1) an unknown intercept, and 2) an unknown slope. In each of these two scenarios, firms observe private signals about the unknown parameter. We show that in the scenario-1, if the private signal observed by firms is accurate enough, information exchange is profitable and in the scenario-2, if there is a sufficiently large variation in the demand slope and private signals are accurate enough, firms earn strictly higher profits by sharing their information rather than keeping it private.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
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