Security of the Bennett-Brassard Quantum Key Distribution Protocol against Collective Attacks

Algorithms

Michel Boyer¹  Ran Gelles ☆² 

[1] Département IRO, Université de Montréal, CP 6128 Succ. Centre-Ville, Montréal H3C 3J7, Canada;Computer Science Department, Technion, Haifa 32000, Israel E-mails: (

关键词: QKD;    security;    collective attacks;    error-rate threshold;   

DOI  :  10.3390/a2020790

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

The theoretical Quantum Key-Distribution scheme of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) has been proven secure against very strong attacks including the collective attacks and the joint attacks. Though the latter are the most general attacks, collective attacks are much easier to analyze, yet, they are conjectured to be as informative to the eavesdropper. Thus, collective attacks are likely to be useful in the analysis of many theoretical and practical schemes that are still lacking a proof of security, including practical BB84 schemes. We show how powerful tools developed in previous works for proving security against the joint attack, are simplified when applied to the security of BB84 against collective attacks whilst providing the same bounds on leaked information and the same error threshold.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2009 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.