Equity versus Efficiency? Evidence from Three-Person Generosity Experiments

Games

Werner Güth¹  Kerstin Pull²  Manfred Stadler³ 

[1] Strategic Interaction Group, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Straße 10, 07745 Jena, Germany;Human Resource Management and Organization, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Nauklerstraße 47, 72074 Tübingen, Germany;Economic Theory, Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, Mohlstraße 36, 72074 Tübingen, Germany

关键词: generosity game;    equity;    efficiency;    experiment;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g1020089

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

In two-person generosity games, the proposer’s agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer’s choice of the pie size. In three-person generosity games, equal agreement payoffs for two of the players are either exogenously excluded or imposed. We predict that the latter crowds out - or at least weakens - efficiency seeking. Our treatments rely on a 2x3 factorial design, differing in whether the responder or the third (dummy) player is the residual claimant and whether the proposer’s agreement payoff is larger, equal, or smaller than the other exogenously given agreement payoff.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2010 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Switzerland.