Balanced Weights and Three-Sided Coalition Formation

Games

Emiliya Lazarova¹ 

[1] Management School, Queen’s University Belfast, 25 University Square, Belfast BT7 1NN, UK

关键词: core;    hedonic games;    three-sided matching;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g1020159

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

We consider three-sided coalition formation problems when each agent is concerned about his local status as measured by his relative rank position within the group of his own type and about his global status as measured by the weighted sum of the average rankings of the other types of groups. We show that a core stable coalition structure always exists, provided that the corresponding weights are balanced and each agent perceives the two types of status as being substitutable.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2010 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.