Games | |
The Minority of Three-Game: An Experimental and Theoretical Analysis | |
Thorsten Chmura1  | |
[1] Department of Economics, University of Munich, Ludwigstrasse 59, Munich 80539, Germany | |
关键词: coordination; minority game; mixed strategy; learning models; experiments; | |
DOI : 10.3390/g2030333 | |
来源: mdpi | |
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【 摘 要 】
We report experimental results on the minority of three-game, where three players choose one of two alternatives and the most rewarding alternative is the one chosen by a single player. This coordination game has many asymmetric equilibria in pure strategies that are non-strict and payoff-asymmetric and a unique symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in which each player's behavior is based on the toss of a fair coin. This straightforward behavior is predicted by equilibrium selection, impulse-balance equilibrium, and payoff-sampling equilibrium. Experimental participants rely on various decision rules, and only a quarter of them perfectly randomize.
【 授权许可】
CC BY
【 预 览 】
Files | Size | Format | View |
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RO202003190048256ZK.pdf | 314KB | ![]() |