Coordination, Differentiation and Fairness in a Population of Cooperating Agents

Games

Anne-Ly Do¹  Lars Rudolf¹ 

[1]¹Max Planck Institute for the Physics of Complex Systems, Nöthnitzer Str. 38, Dresden 01187, Germany[2] height:6px

[3]"> ²Department of Engineering Mathematics, University of Bristol, Merchant Venturers Building, Bristol BS8 1TR, UK

关键词: self-organization;    coordination;    snowdrift game;    adaptive network;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g3010030

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

In a recent paper, we analyzed the self-assembly of a complex cooperation network. The network was shown to approach a state where every agent invests the same amount of resources. Nevertheless, highly-connected agents arise that extract extraordinarily high payoffs while contributing comparably little to any of their cooperations. Here, we investigate a variant of the model, in which highly-connected agents have access to additional resources. We study analytically and numerically whether these resources are invested in existing collaborations, leading to a fairer load distribution, or in establishing new collaborations, leading to an even less fair distribution of loads and payoffs.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY) which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.