期刊论文详细信息
Games | |
Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden | |
Ola Andersson1  | |
[1] Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Grevgatan 34, Stockholm 102 15, Sweden | |
关键词: free-riding; communication; coordination; | |
DOI : 10.3390/g4030497 | |
来源: mdpi | |
【 摘 要 】
This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.
【 授权许可】
CC BY
© 2013 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
【 预 览 】
Files | Size | Format | View |
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RO202003190033639ZK.pdf | 124KB | download |