Speech Is Silver, Silence Is Golden

Games

Ola Andersson¹ 

[1] Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN), Grevgatan 34, Stockholm 102 15, Sweden

关键词: free-riding;    communication;    coordination;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g4030497

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

This paper experimentally investigates free-riding behavior on communication cost in a coordination game and finds strong indications of such free-riding. Firstly, the subjects wait for others to send a message when communication is costly, which does not happen when communication is costless. Secondly, the proportion of games where no communication or one-way communication takes place is much higher when communication is costly compared to when it is free.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2013 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.