Games | |
Auctioning the Right to Play Ultimatum Games and the Impact on Equilibrium Selection | |
Jason Shachat1  | |
[1] Wang Yanan Institute for Studies in Economics (WISE) and the MOE Key Laboratory in Econometrics, Xiamen University, Xiamen 361005, Fujian, China; E-Mail: | |
关键词: ultimatum bargaining; auction; forward induction; loss avoidance; | |
DOI : 10.3390/g4040738 | |
来源: mdpi | |
【 摘 要 】
We auction scarce rights to play the Proposer and Responder positions in ultimatum games. As a control treatment, we randomly allocate these rights and charge exogenous participation fees. These participation fee sequences match the auction price sequence from a session of the original treatment. With endogenous selection via auctions, we find that play converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium, and auction prices emerge supporting this equilibrium by the principle of forward induction. With random assignment, we find play also converges to a session-specific Nash equilibrium as predicted by the principle of loss avoidance. While Nash equilibria with low offers are observed, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium never is.
【 授权许可】
CC BY
© 2013 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.
【 预 览 】
Files | Size | Format | View |
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RO202003190031035ZK.pdf | 731KB | download |