Characterizing the Incentive Compatible and Pareto Optimal Efficiency Space for Two Players, k Items, Public Budget and Quasilinear Utilities

Games

Anat Lerner¹ 

[1] Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, The Open University of Israel, 1 University Road, Raanana 4353701, Israel; E-Mail:

关键词: budget constraints;    Pareto efficiency;    incentive compatibility;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g5020097

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

We characterize the efficiency space of deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto-optimal combinatorial auctions in a model with two players and k nonidentical items. We examine a model with multidimensional types, private values and quasilinear preferences for the players with one relaxation: one of the players is subject to a publicly known budget constraint. We show that if it is publicly known that the valuation for the largest bundle is less than the budget for at least one of the players, then Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) uniquely fulfills the basic properties of being deterministic, dominant-strategy incentive compatible, individually rational and Pareto optimal. Our characterization of the efficient space for deterministic budget constrained combinatorial auctions is similar in spirit to that of Maskin 2000 for Bayesian single-item constrained efficiency auctions and comparable with Ausubel and Milgrom 2002 for non-constrained combinatorial auctions.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2014 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.