From Bargaining Solutions to Claims Rules: A Proportional Approach

Games

José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez¹  António Osório¹  Josep E. Peris² 

[1] Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Departament d’Economia and CREIP, Av.Universitat 1, Reus 43204, Spain; E-Mail:;Universitat d’Alacant, Departament de Mètodes Quantitatius i Teoria Econòmica, Alacant 03080, Spain; E-Mail:

关键词: bargaining problem;    conflicting claims problem;    proportionality;    bargaining solutions;    claims rules;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g6010032

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

Agents involved in a conflicting claims problem may be concerned with the proportion of their claims that is satisfied, or with the total amount they get. In order to relate both perspectives, we associate to each conflicting claims problem a bargaining-in-proportions set. Then, we obtain a correspondence between classical bargaining solutions and usual claims rules. In particular, we show that the constrained equal losses, the truncated constrained equal losses and the contested garment (Babylonian Talmud) rules can be obtained throughout the Nash bargaining solution.

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.