How Moral Codes Evolve in a Trust Game

Games

Jean Paul Rabanal²  Daniel Friedman¹ 

[1] Department of Economics, University of California Santa Cruz, 1156 High Street, Santa Cruz, CA 95064, USA; E-Mail:;Economics Department, Ball State University, 2000 W. University Ave. Muncie, IN 47306, USA

关键词: Prisoner’s Dilemma;    evolutionary stability;    moral codes;   

DOI  :  10.3390/g6020150

来源: mdpi

【 摘 要 】

This paper analyzes the dynamic stability of moral codes in a two population trust game. Guided by a moral code, members of one population, the Trustors, are willing to punish members of the other population, the Trustees, who defect. Under replicator dynamics, adherence to the moral code has unstable oscillations around an interior Nash Equilibrium (NE), but under smoothed best response dynamics we obtain convergence to Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE).

【 授权许可】

CC BY   
© 2015 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.