Deterring and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism

Journal of Strategic Security

Klein, John J.¹ 

[1] ANSERANSERANSER

关键词: Al-Qaida;    International law;    Nonstate actors;    Nuclear weapons and nonproliferation;    Strategy;    Terrorism / counterterrorism;    Weapons of mass destruction;   

DOI  :  10.5038/1944-0472.5.1.2

学科分类：建筑学

来源: Henley-Putnam University Press

【 摘 要 】

While nuclear deterrence theory may be well-suited to dealing with nuclear-armed states, its suitability for deterring nuclear terrorism has frequently been questioned since 9/11. While terrorist organizations do not necessarily act uniformly or according to the same underlying beliefs, many of the most aggressive organizations are motivated by an ideology that embraces martyrdom and an apocalyptic vision.1 This ideology may be based on religion or a desire to overthrow a government. Consequently, terrorists motivated by ideology who intend to use a stolen or improvised nuclear device against the United States or its interests may not care about the resulting military repercussions following a nuclear attack. In such a scenario, some strategists think a terrorist organization's leadership may prove "undeterrable" by traditional military means. Nevertheless, deterrence is still a critical element in U.S. national strategy to prevent a nuclear attack. Furthermore, deterrence combined with dissuasion works to reduce the likelihood of nuclear terrorism being used against the United States, while also mitigating the consequences should such an act actually occur.

【 授权许可】

Unknown