| Computer Science and Information Systems | |
| Prevention of cross-update privacy leaks on android | |
| Cho, Beumjin1  | |
| 关键词: android; privacy; information flow; permission; | |
| DOI : 10.2298/CSIS170728047C | |
| 学科分类:社会科学、人文和艺术(综合) | |
| 来源: Computer Science and Information Systems | |
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【 摘 要 】
Updating applications is an important mechanism to enhance their availability, functionality, and security. However, without careful considerations, application updates can bring other security problems. In this paper, we consider a novel attack that exploits application updates on Android: a cross-update privacy-leak attack called COUPLE. The COUPLE attack allows an application to secretly leak sensitive data through the cross-update interaction between its old and new versions; each version only has permissions and logic for either data collection or transmission to evade detection. We implement a runtime security system, BREAKUP, that prevents cross-update sensitive data transactions by tracking permission-use histories of individual applications. Evaluation results show that BREAKUP’s time overhead is below 5%. We further show the feasibility of the COUPLE attack by analyzing the versions of 2;009 applications (28;682 APKs).
【 授权许可】
CC BY-NC-ND
【 预 览 】
| Files | Size | Format | View |
|---|---|---|---|
| RO201911044409208ZK.pdf | 539KB |
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